In The Methods of Ethics Henry Sidgwick draws more than one contrast between ancient and modern ethical conceptions. He contrasts attractive and imperatival ethical concepts, concluding that Greek ethics is fundamentally attractive whereas modern ethics is fundamentally imperatival (ME 105–6). He glosses this contrast in terms of a contrast between the good and the right; whereas Greek ethics treats the good as the fundamental ethical concept, modern ethical conceptions take deontic or juridical concepts about duty and obligation to be fundamental. But Sidgwick also identifies Greek ethics as egocentric in a way that modern ethics is not (ME 91–2). Ancient ethical conceptions tend to be oriented around the question 'What sort of life should I live?' and assume that the answer to that question would be a life that promotes the agent’s own eudaimonia or happiness. Sidgwick does not explicitly identify the modern ethical assumption that contrasts with Greek egocentrism. But we might suppose that it is a kind of impartiality and cosmopolitanism that does not filter other-regarding concern through the lens of the agent’s own eudaimonia but recognizes the claims that common humanity imposes on agents. It is this second contrast between ancient eudaimonism and modern cosmopolitanism on which I will focus.

Ancient eudaimonism recognizes some familiar moral virtues and other-regarding duties, but these tuistic concerns must contribute to the agent’s own eudaimonia in some way. For instance, in the Republic Plato defends the claim that justice is a genuine

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1 It is a pleasure and honour for me to help celebrate Gail Fine’s and Terry Irwin’s careers, especially since they played such a crucial role in forming my philosophical character and nurturing my love for the history of ethics, both ancient and modern. This essay engages issues that have concerned me since graduate school at Cornell and on which I have learned so much from Terry’s own work on related topics.


3 In equating eudaimonia and happiness, I assume that the subjective connotations that happiness may have for some modern ears is not an insurmountable obstacle to us understanding the ancient concept of eudaimonia as happiness. See Richard Kraut, ‘Two Conceptions of Happiness’ Philosophical Review 88 (2), 1979: 167–97. Those who are not persuaded should feel free to understand eudaimonia as the personal good, which may or may not be equivalent to happiness.
virtue, contributing to the agent’s own eudaimonia, by arguing that justice and its other-regarding demands contribute to the psychic order of the agent’s soul. As this example illustrates, eudaimonist justifications of other-regarding or tuistic concern have an inside-out structure, grounding other-regarding concern in the agent’s own eudaimonia. An inside-out constraint on tuistic justification seems likely to limit the scope of ethical concern. As we will see, Aristotle equates ethical concern for others with general justice and conceives of justice as predicated on a kind of friendship. While friendship does explain eudaimonistic concern for others, it limits this concern to those with whom one is appropriately related, and this explains ways in which Aristotle’s conception of ethical concern is parochial.

Sidgwick is surely right in claiming that ancient ethics is egocentric. However, his contrast between ancient and modern ethics is misguided if he believes that modern ethics does not display any of the egocentrism of the ancients. In different ways, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Bradley, and Green all carry egocentrism into the modern period. Nonetheless, with the exception of the Stoics, it seems true that only in the modern period do we see the emergence of ethical conceptions that are explicitly universalistic in a fundamental way, insisting that everyone has moral standing and can make valid claims on others. This kind of impartial or cosmopolitan ethical concern receives clear philosophical expression in Kantian and utilitarian conceptions of morality. Even if modern ethics is not consistently cosmopolitan, Sidgwick may well believe that this is the predominant and distinctive tendency of modern ethics, in contrast with ancient ethics.

But before we accept this contrast between ancient and modern conceptions, we should ask if the apparent tension between eudaimonism and cosmopolitan concern is genuine or, at least, inevitable. One way to test this perceived tension between eudaimonism and cosmopolitan concern is by contrasting Aristotelian parochialism with Stoic cosmopolitanism. The Stoics share Aristotle’s eudaimonist commitments. But whereas Aristotle’s eudaimonism leads him to pursue an inside-out justification of tuistic concern that is limited in scope, the Stoics believe that we have eudaimonist reason to be concerned with any rational being. Indeed, it is precisely Stoic cosmopolitanism that has led many to view them as anticipating modern moral conceptions and representing a bridge between ancient and modern ethics (cf. ME 105).

However, I am skeptical that the Stoics succeed in reconciling their cosmopolitan and eudaimonistic commitments. This conclusion might seem to reinforce the difficulty of reconciling eudaimonism and cosmopolitan concern and so may seem to support Sidgwick’s contrast between ancient and modern ethics. But the Aristotelian justification of tuistic concern can take a less parochial form than Aristotle himself recognized. Building on resources contained in Aristotle’s justification of tuistic concern, we can defend a form of ethical concern that is universal in scope. If so, we can reconcile eudaimonism with one form of cosmopolitan concern, perhaps surprisingly, using Aristotle, rather than the Stoics, as our guide.

This is obviously an ambitious project with many moving parts, both interpretive and systematic. In the interest of comparing and assessing Aristotelian and Stoic
commitments about eudaimonism and cosmopolitan concern, I must be selective in my treatment of each, ignoring interesting complexities that would be appropriate to discuss in a longer or narrower treatment. I hope that the interest of the issues that will be my focus compensates for these simplifications.

1. Eudaimonism

Virtually all of Greek ethics is eudaimonist in character, treating the agent’s own eudaimonia or happiness as the central or foundational element. In particular, eudaimonism implies that the agent’s happiness is the final good—other things are pursued for its sake, and it is not pursued for the sake of anything else. This is a claim, at least in the first instance, about the structure of justification among various kinds of goods or ends. As such, eudaimonism implies that the virtues are to be chosen for the sake of happiness. For instance, the eudaimonist can claim that the virtues contribute either instrumentally or constitutively to happiness.

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are all eudaimonists. In Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates assumes that the virtues would improve and benefit young men if they were to acquire them. This seems reasonably plausible about self-regarding virtues, such as temperance. But it might seem less obvious as applied to other-regarding virtues, such as justice. The Gorgias addresses eudaimonist concerns about justice. There, Callicles accepts the eudaimonist constraint on the virtues, but he contrasts real and conventional justice, arguing that real justice, unlike conventional justice, benefits the agent, rather than others (483b–488b). Socrates responds by arguing that familiar, other-regarding justice is a virtue, because it is necessary for psychic restraint and a well-ordered soul. In the Republic Thrasymachus denies that justice is a virtue because he thinks it benefits others, rather than the agent. Glaucon and Adeimantus develop Thrasymachus’s doubts about justice, conceding that justice is often instrumentally valuable but challenging Socrates to show that justice is valuable for its own sake, as well as its consequences (357b–367e). In Books IV and VIII–IX Socrates defends the claim that justice is a virtue to be admired and practiced, by arguing that justice contributes constitutively to the happiness of the agent who is just. Aristotle is also a eudaimonist. In the Nicomachean Ethics he claims that although people have different conceptions of eudaimonia, we all treat eudaimonia as the final good (1095a17–21). Eudaimonia is the only


5 Hence, I understand eudaimonism primarily as a claim about justification, rather than motivation.

6 Three works on ethics are often attributed to Aristotle—the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Eudemian Ethics (EE), and the Magna Moralia (MM). Here, I focus primarily on NE, but supplement it sometimes with the EE. Unless context specifies otherwise, references to and quotes from Aristotle’s Ethics are to the
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unconditionally complete good. It alone is choiceworthy for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; all other things are choiceworthy for the sake of eudaimonia (1097a27–b6). In particular, the virtues are chosen for the sake of eudaimonia.

Eudaimonism is also accepted in most of the Hellenistic schools. In *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman Torquatus describes their hedonistic conception of eudaimonia and argues that we have reason to cultivate other-regarding virtues such as justice because of their instrumental advantages. The Stoics also take the human good to be central. Unlike the Epicureans, they agree with Aristotle in claiming that the human good consists in a form of virtue that involves living in accord with nature. Because the human function consists in rational activity, they conclude that the good involves a life of virtue regulated by the rational part of the agent’s soul (DL vii 84–9; Fin iii 20–1). So, like Aristotle and unlike the Epicureans, the Stoics assign intrinsic, and not merely instrumental, value to the virtues. But unlike Aristotle, who sees virtue as the controlling ingredient in a life that also contains goods of fortune, the Stoics identify happiness with virtue, claiming that virtue is sufficient for happiness and famously treating goods of fortune as preferred indifferents (DL vii 89, 102, 107, 127; Fin iii 11, 20–39).

2. Aristotle on Justice and Friendship

Aristotle does not expressly engage eudaimonist worries about the other-regarding virtues such as justice in the way that Plato does. But, as a eudaimonist, Aristotle owes us an explanation of how familiar tuistic traits, such as courage and justice, are genuine virtues, contributing to the agent's happiness. The resources for such an explanation lie in his accounts of justice and friendship.

In the *Rhetoric* (19) Aristotle links virtue with what is fine (*kalon*). To be fine, something must be both choiceworthy in itself and praiseworthy. He suggests that actions that benefit others are most likely to elicit praise and seem praiseworthy.

Virtue is, according to the usual view, a faculty of providing and preserving good things; or a faculty of conferring many great benefits, and benefits of all kinds on all occasions. The parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom. If virtue is a faculty of beneficence, the highest kinds of it must be those which are most useful to others, and for this reason men honor most the just and the courageous... [1366a36–b6]


Indeed, Aristotle suggests that the virtues are not just other-regarding traits but involve concern for others, *rather than* oneself.

[Fine] also are . . . all actions done for the sake of others, since these less than other actions are done for one's own sake; and all successes which benefit others and not oneself; and services done to one's benefactors, for this is just; and good deeds generally, since they are not directed to one's own profit. [1367a1–5]

But if we identify the virtues with selfless altruism, as Aristotle seems to here, this reinforces, rather than resolves, the worry that they won't satisfy the eudaimonist constraint. It is significant, therefore, that in the *Ethics* Aristotle claims that the fine action benefits not only others but also the agent. Virtues must aim at and secure a *common good*, common to the agent and others. For instance, general justice, which is complete virtue in relation to another (1129b20–30), aims at the benefit of the community and the common good (1129b15–18). These connections among the fine, the common good, and the agent's own good are clearest in Aristotle's discussion of true self-love in *Ethics* IX 8.

And when everyone competes to achieve what is fine and strains to do the finest actions, everything that is right will be done for the common good, and each person individually will receive the greatest of goods, since that is the character of virtue. [1169a8–12]

Whereas the *Rhetoric* treats virtues as involving selfless altruism, the *Ethics* sees them as being good for others and the agent. For Aristotle, as for Socrates, and Plato, the real test case for this claim is justice, because justice is perhaps the most clearly other-regarding virtue (*Rhetoric* 1366a34–1367b6).

Aristotle's insistence on the connection among justice, the good of a community, and the common good suggests that we look to his justification of friendship for help in justifying justice, because friendship is the virtue appropriate to communities or associations and includes the perfection of justice (*NE* 1155a22–8, 1159b25–1160a8; *EE* 1242a19–b1). Moreover, the appeal to friendship seems promising, because Aristotle makes two important claims about some forms of friendship.

1. The best sort of friendship involves concern for the other's own sake.
2. One's friend is another or second self (*heteros autos*).

Together, these two claims may permit a eudaimonist justification of tuistic concern. (1) promises to secure other-regarding concern, while (2) promises to show that such concern is in the agent's own interest. This gives an importance to Aristotle's discussion of friendship that could explain why he devotes what might otherwise seem to be disproportionate attention (two whole books) to friendship.⁹

⁹ Even justice gets only one book (*NE* V), and it is not uncommon to regard friendship, unlike justice, as a comparatively minor virtue.
Initially, Aristotle distinguishes three main kinds of friendship: (1) friendship for advantage, (2) friendship for pleasure, and (3) complete friendship found between virtuous people (VIII 3–8). Both advantage-friendship and pleasure-friendship, Aristotle claims, can involve something less than concern for the other's own sake (1156a11–13). He insists that virtue-friendship supplies the 'focal meaning' of friendship. In calling virtue-friendship the best or most complete kind of friendship, he signals that it is friendship to the fullest extent and that other associations are friendships insofar as they approximate it (1157a25–33; EE 1236a16–b27).

Virtue-friendship cannot be widespread inasmuch as virtuous people are rare (1156b25), and this sort of friendship requires a degree of intensity that cannot be maintained on a large scale (1158a11–17, 1171a1–20). Complete friends share similar psychological states, such as aims and goals (1170b16–17) and live together, sharing thought and discussion (1157b8–19, 1159b25–33, 1166a1–12, 1171b30–1172a6). Virtue-friendship 'reflects the comparative worth of the friends' (1158b28). The true friend aims at what is good (1162a5, b12, 1165b14–16) and fine (1168b28–1169a12). Because virtue is fine, the friend is concerned with his friend's virtue. This explains why Aristotle thinks that one cannot remain friends with someone who becomes irredeemably vicious (1165b14–21), that the vicious cannot even love themselves (1166b2–27), and that the person who values and aims to promote his own virtue is the true self-lover (1168a28–1169a12).

Aristotle anticipates some of his claims about the justification of virtue-friendship (which begins at IX 4) in VIII 12, where he suggests that we should take parental friendship as our model of friendship. The parent is concerned with the child's welfare for the child's own sake. This concern is appropriate on eudaimonist grounds, because the parent can regard the child as 'another self' (1161b19, 28). This is apparently because the child owes its existence and physical and psychological nature in significant part to the parent. This both echoes and helps explain the common view that a parent's interests are extended by the life of the child. Aristotle suggests similar claims can be made about friendship between siblings. In virtue of living together, siblings causally interact in important ways and share many things in common and so can regard each other as second selves (1161b30–5).

The account of familial-friendship brings out what is crucial to justifying the other-regarding concern of virtue-friendship. Aristotle explains the justification of virtue-friendship in terms of proper self-love (1166a1–2, 10, 1166a30–2, 1168b1–1169a12).

The excellent person is related to his friend in the same way as he is related to himself, since a friend is another self; and therefore, just as his own being is choiceworthy for him, the friend's being is choiceworthy for him in the same or a similar way. [1170b6–9; cf. 1168b2–6]

This passage expresses the eudaimonist's inside-out perspective in which interpersonal relations are modeled on intrapersonal ones. Proper self-love requires a proper conception of the self and of what is beneficial for the self, as we can see when we distinguish it from vulgar self-love.
However, it is this [the virtuous person] more than any other sort of person who seems to be a self-lover. At any rate, he awards himself what is finest and best of all, and gratifies the most controlling part of himself, obeying it in everything. And just as a city and every other composite system seems to be above all its most controlling part, the same is true of a human being; hence someone loves himself most if he likes and gratifies this part. [1168b28–34; cf. 1166a15–23]

Here, Aristotle identifies a person with the controlling part of his soul. Because a human is essentially a psycho-physical compound in which reason can regulate thought and action (1097b24–1098a16, 1102b13–1103a3), the persistence of an individual consists in the continuous employment of his rational faculties to regulate his thought and action. I preserve or extend myself by exercising my practical reason—forming beliefs and desires, deliberating about them, and acting as the result of deliberate choice.

If this is what underlies Aristotle’s account of intrapersonal love, we can see how interpersonal love or friendship might be modeled on it. Psychological interaction and influence explain interpersonal, as well as intrapersonal, unity. This sort of unity can be found, presumably to a lesser extent, between two different persons who are friends, because friends share similar psychological states, such as aims and goals (1170b16–17) and live together (1159b25–33, 1166a1–12, 1171b30–1172a6). This suggests the following understanding of Aristotle’s inside-out strategy for justifying tuistic concern.

1. Concern for myself should take the form of concern for the rational part of my soul.
2. Concern for myself involves concern for my future self, which is a self that is psychologically dependent on my present self in a reasons-responsive way.
3. I am related to my friend by psychological influence and interdependence in much the same way my future self is related to my present self.
4. Just as my future self extends my interests, so too do the interests of my friend.
5. Hence, I should regard my friend as a second self and care about her for her own sake just as I care about my own future self for its own sake.

This explains why Aristotle thinks we can view a friend as a second self and how he can view the justification of friendship in terms of self-love.10

3. The Scope of the Common Good

If tuistic concern justified on eudaimonist grounds is limited to friendship, the scope of other-regarding concern will be quite limited. However, Aristotle can extend the scope of his eudaimonist justification of interpersonal concern from friends to other members

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10 This interpretation of how Aristotle thinks that the relation between lover and beloved makes the beloved a second self to the lover is similar in important ways to the way in which Plato thinks that philosophical eros is the next best thing to immortality for the lover (Symposium 206c–208b). For discussion of the Platonic account, see Richard Kraut, ‘Egoism, Love, and Political Office in Plato’ Philosophical Review 82 (3), 1973: 330–44; Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory, 241–2, 267–73, and Plato’s Ethics, ch. 18.
of a just political community. It is true that he recognizes that virtue-friendship can't hold on the scale of a political community that is just (1158a11–12, 1170b29–1171a20; *Politics* 1262b3–20) and that political communities are associations for mutual advantage and do not involve the best sort of friendship (1160a11–15). These are parts of Aristotle's critique of Plato's account of political association in the *Republic* as reflecting a dilute form of friendship (*Politics* 1262b14–18). Nonetheless, political communities that are just have to a significant degree the two features that are crucial to the justification of virtue-friendship and familial-friendship: there is commonality of aims and aspirations among members of the political association, and this commonality is produced and sustained by members of the association living together in the right way, in particular by defining their aims and goals consensually (1155a24–8, 1167a25–b8). Insofar as this is true, members of such a political association can see the interests of other members implicated in their own interests and can aim at justice for its own sake, because it promotes the common good, which is presumably the good common to them insofar as they are members of an interdependent political community (1129b15–18). This begins to explain Aristotle's reasons for his well-known belief that we are essentially political animals (1097b9–12; *Politics* 1253a2) and that, as a result, the complete good for an individual can only be realized in a political community.

Though the scope of the common good extends beyond intimate personal friendship to civic friendship, it seems to be limited to those with whom the agent is psychologically connected. If so, the scope of Aristotelian concern may still seem too narrow. We can see this by considering the reservations expressed by the nineteenth-century British idealist T.H. Green about Aristotle's conception of the common good. In his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Green develops a perfectionist ethical theory that aims to provide a synthesis of the best elements in the ancient and modern traditions. Whereas he thought that Aristotle was right to ground an agent's duties in an account of eudaimonia the principal ingredient of which is a conception of virtue regulated by the common good (§§253, 256, 263, 271, 279), he thought the Greeks had too narrow a conception of various virtues and the common good (§§257, 261–2, 265–6, 270, 279–80).

The idea of a society of free and law-abiding persons, each his own master yet each his brother's keeper, was first definitely formed among the Greeks, and its formation was the condition of all subsequent progress in the direction described; but with them... it was limited in its application to select groups of men surrounded by populations of aliens and slaves. In its universality, as capable of application to the whole human race, an attempt has first been made to act upon it in modern Christendom. [§271]

Green's own conception of the common good is universal or cosmopolitan, which he regards as a distinctively modern idea. Full self-realization occurs only when each respects the claims made by other members of a maximally inclusive community of ends (§§214, 216, 244, 332). Indeed, Green endorses the Humanity Formula of Kant's...

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Categorical Imperative, requiring that one treat all rational agents as ends in themselves and never merely as means, though he believes that this form of cosmopolitanism is a demand of self-realization.

One might try to meet Green’s objection to Aristotle by appealing to resources in Aristotelian eudaimonism. There already are significant forms of personal, social, and economic interaction and interdependence between Aristotle’s citizens, on the one hand, and women, slaves, manual laborers, and resident aliens, on the other hand. This interaction provides the basis for including them in a common good. If they are part of the common good, they ought be given a share in citizenship, inasmuch as Aristotle believes that political activity is part of the good of rational animals (Politics V 8–9, esp. 1329a35–8).12

This possible expansion of Aristotle’s conception of the scope of the common good is arguably motivated by Aristotelian ideas and so could be viewed as a friendly amendment to Aristotle. But it falls short of delivering a genuinely universal conception of the common good of the sort Green wants. Predicated as it is on a shared history of interaction, the Aristotelian justification of tuistic concern seems destined to be parochial. For there must be someone—the proverbial remotest Mysian—with whom one has no prior history, however indirect, who comes within one’s causal orbit.13 It seems unclear how the Aristotelian could justify concern for the remotest Mysian, for instance, to save her from a runaway olive cart, at least if one could do so at little cost or risk to oneself. Presumably, this is the point of the parable about the Good Samaritan (Luke 10: 29–37).

Aristotle may believe that a virtuous person should have concern for the remotest Mysian. In Book IV of the Ethics he mentions the nameless virtue of the person who is beneficent and well disposed to others, as friends are to each other, even though he has no shared history and no prior special concern with those to whom he is beneficent (1126b20–1127a8). We might call this virtue ‘friendliness’, to note its similarities and differences with friendship. Then at the beginning of Book VIII Aristotle suggests that there can be a form of friendship based on common humanity (philanthrōpia) (1155a20–3). Because philanthrōpia is based on common humanity, it would presumably extend to those, such as the remotest Mysian, with whom one has no prior history or concern. Indeed, perhaps philanthrōpia just is the sort of friendliness introduced in Book IV. It is reasonably clear that philanthrōpia would entail cosmopolitan concern with wide scope. What is not clear is how philanthrōpia would satisfy the eudaimonist constraint. Like friendship, philanthrōpia involves good will toward others; but, unlike friendship, philanthrōpia does not require any prior relationship between benefactor and beneficiary. For this reason, it is hard to see how philanthrōpia could be a form of friendship. Insofar as friendship is the key to understanding Aristotle’s eudaimonist rationale for tuistic concern, it is hard to see how philanthrōpia could be justified on

12 For discussion, see my ‘Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community’, 282–8.

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eudaimonist grounds. As long as the inside-out strategy for justifying tuistic concern appeals to shared history, it looks like it cannot justify cosmopolitan concern.

For Aristotle, ethical concern for others is limited in scope. But it appears limited in another way as well. Because Aristotle's justification of tuistic concern justifies A's concern for B insofar as B is psychologically connected with A, it appears to support a form of partiality. Presumably, an agent is party to various forms of association, but the bonds in some associations are stronger than others. For instance, I am more closely connected to my spouse and children than I am to neighbors who are comparative strangers. Aristotle's inside-out strategy of justifying tuistic concern appears to support a form of partiality toward the near and dear. He believes that, all else being equal, it is better to help and worse to harm those to whom one stands in special relations than it is to do these things to others (NE 1160a1–6; Politics 1262a27–30).

4. Stoic Cosmopolitanism

As part of the Greek eudaimonist tradition, the Stoics also face the question about how they can recognize other-regarding traits, such as justice, as genuine virtues. Like Aristotle, they think that justice aims at a common good, but, unlike Aristotle, they think that the scope of the common good should be universal, extending to all members of humanity.

The Stoics recognize that most people tend to have tuistic concern that is limited in two ways. First, normal concern is limited in scope to those with whom we are familiar in some way. Second, normal concern is of variable intensity, favoring those who are near and dear to the agent. On their view, we tend to think of our relations to others in terms of a set of concentric circles, with ourselves in the innermost circle, those near and dear to us in intermediate circles, and weaker relations in outer circles. The circles represent different levels of ethical concern, with the result that we accept partiality in the form of an interpersonal discount rate of concern. Stobaeus reports the views of Hierocles.

Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles, some smaller, others larger, the latter enclosing the former on the basis of their different and unequal dispositions relative to each other. The first and foremost circle is the one which a person has drawn as though around a centre, his own mind…. Next, the second one further removed from the centre but enclosing the first circle; this contains parents, siblings, wife, and children. The third one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and cousins. The next circle includes the other relatives, and this is followed by the circle of local residents, and then the circle of fellow tribesmen, next that of fellow citizens, and then in the same way the circle of people from neighbouring towns, and the circle of fellow countrymen. The outermost and largest circle, which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race.14

We could represent this pattern of conventional ethical concern as in the diagram.

Hierocles implies that conventional ethical concern is universal in scope but variable in weight. In fact, if Aristotle is an exemplar, there is reason to think that normal ethical concern is limited in scope and variable in weight.

But Hierocles rejects these limitations in ordinary patterns of concern. He insists on concern for other rational beings with universal scope and appears to reject an interpersonal discount rate. The previous passage continues as follows.

Once these [concentric circles] have all been surveyed, it is the task of a well tempered man, in his proper treatment of each group, to draw the circles somehow toward the center, and to keep zealously transferring those from the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones. . . . It is incumbent on us to respect people from the third circle, as if they were those from the second, and again to respect our other relatives as if they were from the third circle. . . . The right point will be reached if, through our own initiative, we reduce the distance of the relationship with each person.

Hierocles concludes this passage by claiming that the right perspective contracts, rather than collapses, ordinary distinctions. On one reading, the passage revises ordinary concern by reducing the number of circles and decreasing the distance between them. On this reading, the passage advocates a revisionary pattern of concern but nonetheless maintains some form of interpersonal partiality. However, the first part of the passage seems to require moving those in outer circles into inner circles. But if we follow this counsel consistently, we must treat those in outer circles the same as those in the innermost circle. If we must bring those in the nth orbit into the n−1 orbit, then we must eventually bring everyone into the first circle. On this second

15 Irwin suggests that Stoic cosmopolitanism is compatible with interpersonal partiality, *The Development of Ethics*, §195. For instance, Cicero implies that duties of beneficence should reflect the relationship or ties between benefactor and beneficiary, as well as the importance of the benefit; see Cicero, *De Officiis*, trs. M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) i 45–59. But, as we will see, fundamentally impartial theories, such as utilitarianism, can offer derivative justifications of partiality, which means that partiality, as such, does not require variable weighting at a fundamental level. Moreover, the biggest worry about Stoic cosmopolitanism concerns its claims about the scope, rather than the weight, of interpersonal concern.
reading, the passage rejects both limitations in Aristotelian ethical concern. Though there is some question whether Hierocles is representative of Stoic ethical views here, he articulates a conception of Stoic cosmopolitanism that is closer to some modern conceptions and is worth our attention.¹⁶

We can explain what is distinctive of this form of cosmopolitanism by distinguishing the two claims that Aristotle denies and that this strand in Stoicism affirms—that ethical concern extends to any rational being and that all else being equal every rational being makes an equal claim on the agent’s moral attention. The first claim is one about scope, whereas the second is one about weight. Aristotle’s position is doubly parochial, because he denies both claims. He thinks that ethical concern should be limited to those with whom one has a history of interaction, and he thinks that the degree or weight of ethical concern that one should have for others should be proportional to the strength of the bonds one has with them. By contrast, the Stoic position that we are examining is doubly cosmopolitan, because it affirms that ethical concern should have both universal scope and equal weight. In one sense, this makes Aristotle’s position purely parochial and the Stoic position purely cosmopolitan.

Sidgwick and Green may be right that cosmopolitan concern is a characteristically modern ethical commitment, but it is not a commitment that emerges only in the modern period. The Stoics recognize the appeal of cosmopolitanism and implicitly criticize Aristotle’s more parochial form of tuistic concern. They believe that this cosmopolitan commitment can be reconciled with eudaimonism, because they think that eudaimonism directs us to live in accordance with rational nature, wherever that is found, whether in ourselves or others.

5. The Stoic Reconciliation

Unlike Aristotle, who combines eudaimonism with parochial ethical concern, the Stoics combine eudaimonism with cosmopolitan ethical concern. But how can the Stoics reconcile these two commitments? Why should the virtuous person have an equal regard for all humanity? Because they identify human nature with reason, they think that we each have a natural affinity for reason as such, wherever we find it in humanity. As Cato, Cicero’s Stoic spokesman, explains:

Hence it follows that mutual attraction between men is also something natural. Consequently, the mere fact someone is a man makes it incumbent on another man not to regard him as alien…. We are therefore by nature suited to form unions, societies, and states. [Fin iii 62–8]

¹⁶ Indeed, at one point, Cicero represents the Stoics as concluding that the just person will sometimes have to favor the common good in relation to his own good (Fin iii 64). This could suggest an inversion of the normal interpersonal discount rate, in which an agent should count the good of others for more than his own. But in such cases the good of others may count for more collectively, as opposed to individually, than the agent’s own good. If so, Cicero’s claim is compatible with the Stoics rejecting any interpersonal discount rate.
But it is hard to square Stoic cosmopolitanism with their eudaimonism. Shared rationality itself does not seem to provide a eudaimonist reason for caring about other rational agents. The eudaimonist claims that I have reason to promote my own eudaimonia, which depends upon my nature as a rational being. But then what I have reason to care about, in the first instance, is my own rational agency. The fact that other people are also rational agents does not, without further argument, provide me with eudaimonist reason to care about them. The Stoics would need to show that promoting the agency of other rational beings would promote my own.

The dialectic between eudaimonism and cosmopolitanism here seems relevantly like the dialectic Sidgwick explores between egoism and utilitarianism. In discussing the proof of utilitarianism, Sidgwick considers a related claim that egoism must give way to utilitarianism (ME 382, 403, 420–1, 497–8). The reasoning begins with something the egoist concedes but argues that consistency requires the utilitarian conclusion.

1. I have reason to promote happiness in my life.
2. But I can promote happiness in other lives.
3. The happiness of others is no less important than my happiness.
4. Hence, I have reason to promote happiness generally.

Sidgwick’s considered view is that this argument is problematic. Its cogency turns on the interpretation of (1). That premise is ambiguous between two claims: (a) I have reason to promote my happiness qua happiness, and (b) I have reason to promote my happiness qua my happiness. The argument is valid just in case (1) is read as (1a), not if it is read as (1b). But the egoist will insist on (1b). Appeals to common happiness should not move the egoist, and appeals to common rationality should not move the eudaimonist.

Perhaps the Stoics think that Aristotelian friendship should extend beyond one’s own rational agency to any rational agent. Here, the similarity between the virtuous agent and his virtuous friend may seem to provide the ground of friendship. If what makes anyone virtuous is proper control by the rational part of his soul, then perhaps the virtuous person should be friends with any other rational being.

It is unclear how much similarity Aristotle does or should require among friends. However that issue is resolved, it is clear that similarity is not sufficient for Aristotelian friendship; friendship must be produced and sustained by living together and sharing thought and discussion (1157b5–12, 18–21).

He must, then, perceive his friend’s being together [with his own], and he will do this when they live together and share conversation and thought. For in the case of human beings what seems to count as living together is this sharing of conversation and thought, not sharing the same pasture, as in the case of grazing animals. [1170b10–14]

Even maximal similarity, by itself, would not make for friendship. Even if the remotest Mysian is my doppelgänger, the fact that we have no shared history means that he is not thereby my friend. Our common rationality cannot itself constitute a friendship.
6. The Common Good and Divine Design

However, the Stoics might try to defend their claims about the common good by appeal to their natural teleology, in particular, their assumptions about divine design (DL vii 138–47). Cicero gives expression to the Stoic argument for design in De Natura Deorum (ii 17).

If you see a large and beautiful house, you could not be induced to think that it was built by mice and polecats, even if you do not see the master of the house. If, then, you were to think that the great ornament of the cosmos, the great variety and beauty of the heavenly bodies, the great power and vastness of the sea and land, were your own house and not that of the immortal gods, would you not seem to be downright crazy?

How might divine design help with the eudaimonist defense of justice? Of course, if god is benevolent, then he may care equally that all his creatures fare well, and he may want individual agents to act on cosmopolitan concern and may assign rewards and penalties in an afterlife based on the agent’s record of cosmopolitan concern. But, as Plato observes in the Republic, this would be an instrumental defense of virtue, albeit a perfect instrumental defense. This would not explain how philanthrópia was a virtue to be chosen for its own sake.

But divine design makes possible the idea of theodicy—the idea that the best whole may contain parts that, considered apart from the whole, are imperfect. One might then claim that because individuals are parts of a larger beneficial cosmos what they do for the sake of others makes them better off. This requires interpreting the good of each in terms of the whole of which they are parts.

This is an interesting argument. Perhaps I could see my sacrifices for others compensated if I knew that our world is the product of divine design, that god has commanded justice, and that justice requires me to sacrifice my interests for the sake of another. Then I might be able to see this sacrifice as compensated, provided I interpret my own good in terms of my role in the best community. But I would have to know each of these things independently. Theodicy may give me reason to believe that I live in the best possible world, but it does not itself tell me whether sacrifices are necessary or, if they are, who should bear them. But then I cannot conclude simply from the

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19 Glaucon and Adeimantus ask Socrates to show that justice is the best sort of good, good both for its consequences and in itself. In Book II they concede that justice is instrumentally good and ask Socrates to show that it is good in itself. But their account of the instrumental value of justice shows it to be an imperfect instrumental good, not instrumentally valuable in those circumstances in which one can commit injustice with impunity. There is a sense in which the defense of justice is not complete when Socrates later argues that justice is good for its intrinsic benefits. It is not complete until Book X when Socrates invokes the myth of Er to provide a perfect instrumental defense of justice; the other-worldly rewards of justice and penalties of injustice ensure that justice is always instrumentally best.

fact that the world is ordered for the best that I have reason to care for you or to make sacrifices for your sake.

Moreover, it is not clear that the good of each should be understood in terms of the good of the whole. Perhaps the best whole is one in which I have a very short and miserable life. If so, should we conclude that my life is much better than it appears to be because it has made some contribution to the best whole? Why not conclude instead that the world is best despite or perhaps because of my suffering? But then we couldn't infer that I fare better for participating in a better whole.

Indeed, this argument seems to rest on a confusion of parts and wholes. Consider an intrapersonal analogy to this interpersonal issue. Persons have histories that have parts or stages. It may well be that the best life for Socrates requires some very significant sacrifice early in his life. If so, we can see how Socrates, the person, has reason to make this sacrifice now for the sake of greater later benefits; he is both benefactor and beneficiary, and this explains why there is compensation for the sacrifice. Though Socrates is compensated, his parts are not. Younger Socrates sacrifices and older Socrates benefits. Similarly, the cosmos may be better if some of its parts are worse off than they might otherwise be, but this does not provide compensation to the parts—in this case, particular individuals—who sacrifice for the good of the whole.

Of course, even if the argument were valid, it would still rest on the premise of divine design. As the Epicureans note, the Stoics are arguably too selective in their analysis of the evidence. If one is going to count efficient and beneficial processes as evidence of design, then one should count waste, hardship, and evil as flaws in the design. As Sidgwick hoped, it would be best to find a reconciliation that did not depend on controverted theistic commitments.

7. An Aristotelian Reconciliation

The Aristotelian justification of tuistic concern seemed promising, as far as it went. The problem was that it didn't go far enough. Its scope was too parochial. Given our reservations about the Stoic reconciliation of eudaimonism and cosmopolitan concern, it might be worth revisiting the Aristotelian reconciliation to see if there is any way to expand its scope.

Recall that the Aristotelian reconciliation pursues the inside-out strategy, justifying concern for another insofar as she stands in the same sort of relations of psychological interaction and interdependence to the agent that the agent's own future self stands to her present self. This explains why Aristotle regards friends and associates as second and third selves, and we said that it allows him to claim that agents have reason to


22 I allude here, of course, to Sidgwick's doubts about the possibility of reconciling his own dualism of practical reason between egoism and utilitarianism without resort to a belief in the existence of a God who would reward beneficence and punish indifference to others in an afterlife and his (Sidgwick's) reluctance to accept any reconciliation that transcended an 'independent ethical science' (*ME* 507–8).
be concerned about their fellow citizens. But because the Aristotelian rationale for concern seems to appeal to shared history, it looks like it cannot recognize concern for other rational beings with whom one has no prior history. It must leave concern for the remotest Mysian unjustified.

Is that right? With existing friends and associates, there is shared history and previous interaction, providing a *backward-looking* rationale for concern. By hypothesis, this is absent in my relation to the remotest Mysian. But consider the case where I can save her life by ushering her out of the way of the runaway olive cart at little cost or risk to myself. Though I have no previous connection with her, my assistance would *constitute* such a connection. For my assistance will enable or facilitate her pursuit of her own projects and plans, and this will make her subsequent actions and mental states dependent in certain ways on my assistance. This provides a *forward-looking* rationale for concern for the remotest Mysian. It is true that by itself this one connection may establish a comparatively weak connection between her and me, but it might well be sufficient to justify my making small sacrifices on her behalf. Moreover, other things being equal, the greater the assistance I provide to the remotest Mysian, the greater the dependence of her subsequent actions and states on my assistance, and so the greater the share I earn in her happiness. So, the constitutive connections that beneficence establishes explain how I can benefit from helping the remotest Mysian, and the greater the help I provide, the greater the benefit it provides me and the stronger my reason to help. This rationale appeals to the idea of *forging* a connection with a bigger or more permanent good by contributing to it, and thereby earning a share of that good for oneself. Here, we have eudaimonist reason for tuistic concern that does not appeal to shared history or prior relationship. Instead, it appeals to the very same kind of psychological interdependence that was the ground of concern in cases where there is shared history and points out how beneficence itself establishes that sort of connection.

If successful, this rationale would allow Aristotle to justify ethical concern with universal scope. Indeed, it would explain otherwise puzzling claims that he makes. We saw that Aristotle recognizes a (nameless) virtue of friendliness that involves beneficence in the absence of shared history and affective attachment (1126b2–23) and a form of friendship (*philanthrōpia*) toward con-specifics (1155a20–3). But it was hard to understand how *philanthrōpia* could be a form of friendship, inasmuch as it did not require the shared history that is part of friendship in all its other forms, and it was hard to see how friendliness satisfies the inside-out constraint of eudaimonism. But now that we understand how the psychological interaction and interdependence that is part of shared history in friendship makes the interests of friends interdependent, we can see how beneficence itself, even in the absence of shared history, can earn the

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23 This is the extension of Aristotle’s conception of the common good that Green endorses, though I think that he (Green) is clearer about the conclusion of the argument than about the premises. For further discussion, see David O. Brink, *Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T.H. Green* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), esp. §§XV–XXIII.
benefactor a share of the beneficiary’s happiness. This allows us to see how Aristotle’s eudaimonistic rationale for tuistic concern can indeed be extended to friendliness and *philanthrópia*. This gives us a principled Aristotelian rationale for mixed cosmopolitanism. It also provides a possible rationale for Stoic cosmopolitanism, though only if the Stoics accept the Aristotelian claim that the right sort of psychological interaction and interdependence is the ground of tuistic concern.

8. Eudaimonism and Derivative Concern for Others

Even if Aristotelian eudaimonism can recognize ethical concern with universal scope, it may seem to be an imperfect sort of cosmopolitanism. One concern is that eudaimonism represents other-regarding concern as derivative and instrumental. It seems to justify tuistic concern as a special case of self-love: I have reason to be concerned about others insofar as they do or have the potential to extend my interests. This may seem to imply an inappropriately instrumental and mercenary attitude toward others and toward virtues such as courage and justice. But whereas the Epicureans embrace an instrumental defense of the value of justice (*KD* 33–6; *Fin* i 47–53, ii 78–85), Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics all insist that virtues are choiceworthy for their own sakes. Famously, Glaucon and Adeimantus demand that Socrates show that justice is good in itself and not just for its causal consequences (*Rep* 357b–358d). And Aristotle agrees, insisting that virtues be choiceworthy for their own sake (*NE* 1097b2–5). Similarly, the Stoics insist that virtue is intrinsically good (*Fin* iii 11, 21). Moreover, if eudaimonism requires instrumental concern for one’s friends, this will violate Aristotle’s own requirement that virtuous friends care about one another for the other’s own sake. Even when applied to other forms of friendship or association whose bonds are weaker, eudaimonism may seem to impose an inappropriately colonial or imperialistic perspective on ethical concern.24

It is true that the inside-out strategy that Aristotle (on this interpretation) employs represents a concern for others as derivative. But a derivative concern need not be instrumental or otherwise insufficiently robust. Aristotle’s discussion of complete goods makes room for goods that are derivatively justified that are nonetheless good for their own sakes and not simply instrumental goods (1097a26–b7). *Incomplete* goods are not chosen for their own sakes; they are chosen only for the sake of something else and are mere instrumental goods. By contrast, *complete* goods are chosen for their own sakes; they are intrinsic goods. *Unconditionally complete* goods are chosen for their own sakes and not chosen for the sake of anything else. Eudaimonia is the only unconditionally complete good. This means that merely complete goods are goods in themselves but are also chosen for the sake of eudaimonia, perhaps as parts are chosen for the sakes of the wholes of which they are parts. Here, x is valuable as constituent

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of $y$; it has contributory value and is good in itself. This idea that something might be good both in itself and for the sake of the larger whole of which it is a part is not unfamiliar. For instance, my philosophy articles have structures; they defend larger aims by a series of arguments and so have constituent sub-aims. When I work on a particular sub-argument, I want to get that argument right both for its own sake and for or because of its constituent role in my larger argument. Aristotle makes a similar claim about the value of the virtues. The virtues are complete, but not unconditionally complete, goods (1097a35–b7, 1100b8–11, 1176b1–8). They are choiceworthy in themselves as parts of happiness. In making this claim, he makes explicit the sort of assumptions Plato must make about the relationship between justice and eudaimonia in *Republic* II, where he (Plato) values justice for its own sake and for its constitutive contribution to the agent’s own eudaimonia.

If the agent treats the good of another as a complete good, then the fact that the other’s own good is choiceworthy for the sake of the agent’s own eudaimonia won’t prevent the agent from caring about the other for her own sake. We can see this more clearly if we consider again the analogy between intrapersonal and interpersonal concern. When I undertake a present sacrifice for a future benefit, I do so because the future interests are mine. The on-balance justification of the sacrifice depends on its promoting my overall good. But because my future good is a part of this overall good, concern for my overall good requires, as a constituent part, a concern for my future good. In this way, concern for my future self for its own sake seems compatible with and, indeed, essential to self-love. Here, the justification of concern for my own future self is derivative, but not instrumental. Similarly, if interpersonal psychological relations can extend the agent’s interests, then the good of others can be a part of my overall good, just as my own future good can be. Though the inside-out strategy of justification derives tuistic concern from self-love, it can recognize concern for the other’s own sake.

9. Mixed Cosmopolitanism

A different concern about the Aristotelian reconciliation of eudaimonism and cosmopolitanism is that it is an imperfect kind of cosmopolitanism. For the Aristotelian justification may be able to recognize tuistic concern with universal scope, but it seems committed to recognizing concern with variable, rather than equal, weight. Because the agent has reason to be concerned for others insofar as they are (or can be) psychologically connected to her, her level of concern should be proportional to the degree of connection. But even if there is some actual or potential connection with anyone who is in one’s power to affect, the degree of connection must be variable. Presumably, it is this variable degree of connection that characterizes different forms

of association. My psychological interaction and interdependence are greater with those in my inner circle than with those in my outer circles. Indeed, this is what distinguishes who is in my inner circle and who is in my outer circles. So, the Aristotelian rationale for tuistic concern seems committed to embracing a discount rate of concern of the sort reflected in the model of concentric circles that the Stoics associate with commonsense morality. So even if Aristotle can deliver the sort of universal concern that the Stoics require, he cannot deliver the equal weighting of everyone’s interests that some of them also require.

To assess this concern about Aristotelian cosmopolitanism, we should revisit our earlier contrast between the scope and weight of ethical concern (§4 above). There, we saw that Aristotle’s position is doubly parochial because it recognizes ethical concern with limited scope and variable weight. By contrast, the Stoic view articulated by Hierocles is doubly cosmopolitan because it recognizes ethical concern that combines universal scope and equal weight. But the extended or amended Aristotelian view recognizes ethical concern that combines universal scope and variable weight. In this way, it represents a third possibility, intermediate between parochial and cosmopolitan purebreds. We might call it mixed cosmopolitanism.

The question is whether mixed cosmopolitanism is cosmopolitan enough. In understanding and assessing different cosmopolitan commitments, we might consider C.D. Broad’s defense of a mixed cosmopolitan view that he calls self-referential altruism. In ’Self and Others’ Broad discusses the contrast between Sidgwick’s two main methods of ethics, viz. egoism and utilitarianism.26 He contrasts egoism’s limited scope and partiality with utilitarianism’s universal scope and egalitarian concern. But he thinks that neither adequately captures the demands of commonsense morality. Though Broad thinks that utilitarianism is right to insist that moral concern should extend to any rational (or sentient) creature that it is within one’s power to help or harm, he thinks that its insistence that everyone matters equally fails to recognize special obligations we have toward those to whom we stand in special relationships. Broad thinks commonsense morality recognizes special concern at a fundamental level, reflected in self-referential altruism.

On the other hand, the altruism which common sense approves is always limited in scope. It holds that each of us has specially urgent obligations to benefit certain individuals and groups which stand in certain special relations to himself, e.g., his parents, his children, his fellow-country-men, etc. And it holds that these special relationships are the ultimate and sufficient ground for these specially urgent claims on one’s beneficence. [280]

This passage is ambiguous. On the one hand, it begins by insisting that special relations limit the scope of one’s duties toward others. On the other hand, it also suggests that special relations affect the special urgency or stringency of those obligations. I think

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Broad's considered view is to understand special relations as qualifying the weight, rather than the scope, of moral concern. Elsewhere in this essay, he suggests that any plausible ethical theory must recognize wide scope duties (264). We may debate just how stringent our duties to comparative strangers are, but it seems less controversial that we have non-derivative reason, however weak, to be concerned about the remotest Mysian, such that we would have reason to provide significant aid to her if we could do so at little or no cost to ourselves.

On this reading of self-referential altruism, there is a non-derivative impartial demand to be concerned about anyone whom it is within one's power to benefit but it is also non-derivatively true that the strength or stringency of one's obligations to benefit others is a function of the nature of the relationship between benefactor and beneficiary. This is an ethical conception that has universal scope but variable weight. As such, it is a mixed conception that is cosmopolitan about scope, not weight. It occupies a position intermediate between pure parochialism and pure cosmopolitanism.

Broad defends self-referential altruism's mixed cosmopolitanism against the pure cosmopolitanism of the utilitarians. He is aware that utilitarians can try to provide a derivative justification of partiality. In *The Methods of Ethics* Sidgwick argues that one can accommodate special concern within a utilitarian framework (*ME* 432–9). He claims that we have natural affections toward the near and dear, such that focusing our attention on them tends to yield greater utility. Moreover, our knowledge of what others want and need and our causal powers to benefit others are greater in cases involving those near and dear to us and other associates with whom we have regular contact, with the result that as individuals we do better overall by focusing our energies and actions on associates of one kind or another, rather than the world at large.

But Broad thinks that this derivative justification of special obligations is inadequate. It is not hard to see why. First, even if I get a utility boost from helping my friends, rather than strangers, the strangers whom I could help have their own friends who get a utility boost from seeing their lot improved. So, it seems that I can often produce more utility by providing a greater benefit to strangers (and their friends) than by providing a lesser benefit to my own friends. Second, intimate knowledge is not necessary to benefit others. I may be likely to get a better birthday present for my friend than the remotest Mysian, but it doesn't take special knowledge about personal tastes to know that strangers benefit from basic nutrition, healthcare, education, and life's essentials. Third, our causal reach is not limited in the relevant ways. Even if it is costly to benefit people in far-away places, it is often true that there are needy strangers in our midst who

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27 This version of self-referential altruism treats special relationships as a thumb in the scales of what would otherwise be a utilitarian reckoning. If we think of special relationships as forms of association, we might claim that self-referential altruism adds an *associate-multiplier* to an otherwise utilitarian analysis. On this view, an agent is required to perform that action whose value is greatest after the consequences for everyone have been recorded and multiplied by the relevant factor (equal to or greater than one) corresponding to the significance of the association between the agent and potential beneficiaries. This would be a form of consequentialism that combined agent-neutral and agent-relative aspects.
would benefit more from our assistance than our comparatively prosperous friends and associates. For these reasons, the utilitarian justification of special concern seems insufficiently robust.

Insofar as we agree with Broad that commonsense morality contains a fundamental commitment to partiality, we have reason to take seriously the sort of mixed cosmopolitan commitment to ethical concern with universal scope and variable weight that the Aristotelian view can embrace. The interpersonal discount rate recognized by Aristotelian cosmopolitanism may be a virtue, rather than a vice.

10. Eudaimonist Architecture

The Aristotelian rationale and self-referential altruism agree in preferring mixed to pure cosmopolitanism. But they disagree about the exact architecture of mixed cosmopolitanism. For Broad, universal concern for others and special concern for associates are equally fundamental moral demands, and there is no other demand that is more fundamental. However, on the Aristotelian rationale that we have been exploring, universal concern and special concern are both derived from proper self-love. The Aristotelian can conclude that Broad has underestimated the resources of eudaimonism and egoism. The differences between eudaimonism and theories that build universal concern in as an axiom are bound to look unbridgeable as long as we assume a hedonist conception of happiness, as Sidgwick does and Broad does not dispute. But on Aristotle's perfectionist conception of happiness, eudaimonism and self-referential altruism can agree on matters of ethical substance. The central claims of self-referential altruism do not need to be represented as ethical axioms, as Broad seems to believe, but can be represented as theorems derived from a eudaimonist axiom. The derivative character of these theorems does not prevent them from being fundamental commitments.

According to one of Sidgwick's contrasts between ancient and modern ethics, they are fundamentally opposed conceptions, because whereas ancient ethics is eudaimonist, modern ethics is impartial or cosmopolitan. Their opposition stems from the tension between the inside-out character of the eudaimonist concern for others and the commitments to universal and equal moral standing of all rational beings characteristic of impartiality and (pure) cosmopolitanism. However, Aristotelian eudaimonism can provide a rationale for tuistic concern with universal scope, including the proverbial remotest Mysian. Though this delivers a cosmopolitan conclusion about the proper scope of ethical concern, it must justify tuistic concern with variable weight, depending on the nature of the relationship between the agent and potential beneficiaries. This sort of mixed cosmopolitanism, combining ethical concern with universal scope and variable weight, falls short of the sort of pure cosmopolitanism that insists on ethical concern with both wide scope and equal weight. For this reason, Aristotelian eudaimonism cannot deliver the sort of cosmopolitanism endorsed by some Stoics and some moderns, including Kant and the utilitarians. But, as Broad's disagreement with Sidgwick shows, it is unclear if pure cosmopolitanism does justice to our views
about special concern and special obligations. Perhaps mixed cosmopolitanism is cosmopolitanism enough.

Whether we prefer egocentric or impartialist architecture may depend on how demanding a conception of the common good we accept. Pure cosmopolitanism may require impartialist architecture, but mixed cosmopolitanism can be agnostic between egocentric and impartialist architecture.  

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